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The Genesis of the GATS
(General Agreement on Trade
in Services)
Juan A. Marchetti* and Petros C. Mavroidis**

Abstract
The Uruguay Round services negotiations saw the light of day amidst pressures from lobbies
in developed countries, unilateral retaliatory actions, and ideological struggle in the developing world. The final outcome, the GATS, certainly characterized by a complex structure and
awkward drafting here and there, is not optimal but is an important first step towards the liberalization of trade in services. This article traces the GATS negotiating history, from its very
beginning in the late 1970s, paying particular attention to the main forces that brought the
services dossier to the multilateral trading system (governments, industries, and academics),
and the interaction between developed and developing countries before and during the Uruguay Round. We will follow the actions, positions, and negotiating stances of four trading
partners – Brazil, the European Union, India, and the United States – that were key in the
development of the GATS. Finally, we will, indicatively at least, try to attribute a ‘paternity’
(or, rather, a ‘maternity’) to some key features and provisions of the agreement.

1 Why Should We Turn to the Negotiators?
In the context of the GATS, recourse to the negotiating history is, in our view, passage obligé for those wishing to inform themselves about the rationale for the GATS.
Our interest is not purely historic. Rather, it stems from the absence of an economic
theory explaining the GATS. Indeed, contrary to the GATT, the rationale of which
has been explained on the basis of two competing theories – terms of trade, and commitment theory – there has not been a similar development with regard to the GATS.
Rather, scholars discussing the GATS have usually taken those GATT-related
theoretical developments for granted, and have tried to apply them – somewhat
* Counsellor at the WTO Trade in Services Division. Email: juan.marchetti@wto.org.
** Edwin B. Parker Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, New York, and Professor of Law at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland. He is Research Fellow at the CEPR. Email: PM2030@columbia.edu.
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unsuccessfully – to the services context. But there are reasons to believe that the terms
of trade theory would sit oddly with an agreement like the GATS, which combines pure
trade and trade through establishment of foreign companies. Although not referring
to the GATS directly, Blanchard1 casts doubt on the applicability of the terms of trade
theory in the presence of international ownership, arguing that the latter can mitigate incentives that lead large countries to set inefficiently high tariffs, and that have
been argued as the main reason for having trade agreements such as the GATT. The
GATS, on the other hand, contains too many loopholes to be considered a safe lock-in
mechanism for domestic policies: for this reason, it is hard to argue persuasively that
commitment theory explains its advent.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In section 2, we will discuss
trade and trade policy in services before the advent of the Uruguay Round. Section 3 is
dedicated to the Uruguay Round negotiation, while in section 4 we examine in more
detail the negotiating positions of four key players: Brazil, the European Union (EU),
India, and the United States (US). In defence of our selection we will argue that these
four participants were instrumental in both the course and timing of services negotiations in the Uruguay Round and in shaping each and every one of the salient features
of the GATS. Section 5 concludes.

2 Before the Negotiation (pre-1986)
A Regulation of Trade in Services
Before the advent of the GATS, trade in services was regulated through bilateral and
regional schemes.2 The focus of each of these schemes was quite narrow though.
The US had concluded a number of treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) which regulated relations across countries with respect to specific services,
such as aviation, shipping, and communications.3 Besides that, the US had concluded
free trade agreements with Israel and Canada.4 While the former contained almost no
discipline on trade in services, the latter, concluded in 1987, contained substantive
1

2

3

4

Blanchard, ‘Reevaluating the Role of Trade Agreements: Does Investment Globalization Make the WTO
Obsolete?’, 82 J Int’l Economics (2010) 63.
Bhagwati, ‘The Role of Services in Development’, in UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, Services
and Development, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade (1989), at 5–8. UN Doc. ST/CTC/95 mentions that in early economic analysis services were considered non-tradable. Norman and Stradenes,
‘International Trade in Services: a Comment’, in O. Giarini (ed.), The Emerging Services Economy (1987),
at 44–49, note that the same holds for some goods. Van Holst notes however that, the merits of this
theoretical disquisition notwithstanding, services have been traded for centuries: van Host, ‘The Internationalization of Trade in Services’, in D.L. Riddle (ed.), Information, Economy and Development (1988), at 59.
Brock, ‘A Simple Plan for Negotiating on Trade in Services’, 5 The World Economy (1982) 229, at 236.
The US stopped negotiating FCNs already in the 1950s.
Nyahoho, ‘Libéralisation multilateral du commerce des services: enjeux et stratégie des négociations’, 21
Etudes Internationales (1990) 55. Krommenacker, ‘Multilateral Services Negotiations: From Interest-Lateralism to Reasoned Multilateralism in the Context of the Servicization of the Economy’, in E.-U. Petersmann
and M. Hilf (eds), The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal and Economic Problems (1987),
at 455–463, mentions an agreement between Japan and the US concerning supply of lawyers’ services.
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disciplines on trade and investment in services, as well as the temporary movement of
business persons.
The EU was the only supranational entity with substantial experience in regional
liberalization of trade in services. Moreover, the dismantling of regulations inhibiting
trade in services was identified in the 1985 White Paper on the Internal Market as essential for the achievement of the internal market in 1992.
There was also some industry-specific cooperation: the International Telecommunications Unions (ITU) allocated radio spectrum, assigned satellite orbits, and established
worldwide standards; the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (under the aegis of
the Bank for International Settlements) discussed and set standards on international
banking regulation and supervision (e.g., the Basel Concordat); the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) administered agreements on civil aviation; and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was responsible for measures to improve the safety
and security of international shipping. Within the OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development), the Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations
and the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements have contributed towards reducing
restrictions on capital flows, the right of establishment, and current invisible transactions
(mostly services) and transfers, as well as abolished some restrictions on cash flows.
The absence of a genuine multilateral scheme was no obstacle to the fast increase of
services trade flows, which can be explained by a number of reasons:
(a)	Technology (e.g., the ICT revolution), which made it possible to perform a wide
variety of services at a distant geographical location, thus paving the way to trade
opportunities, and leading ultimately to the outsourcing and offshoring trends
that we are witnessing today;
(b)	The increasing connection between goods and services – since many services are
inputs to goods, the liberalization of trade in goods ipso facto amounted to liberalization of trade in services as well;5
(c)	The shift in employment from manufacturing to services in most OECD countries;6 and
(d)	The trend towards greater specialization in services and the ensuing gains in
productivity.
Although already in the 1980s observers, including the World Bank, seemed to
agree on the increasing importance of trade in services, they had different quantitative estimations of its magnitude.7 The reason for the discrepancy in the estimation
has to do with the inherent difficulties in measuring services, and with the fact that
very few governments had developed at that time reliable and comprehensive data
collection systems.
5
6

7

Schott and Mazza. ‘Trade in Services and Developing Countries’, 20 J World Trade (1986) 253.
Brock, supra note 4, cites statistics to the effect that in the US in 1981, 72% of the non agricultural
population was engaged in service activities (63% in 1961). In Japan the corresponding numbers were
49 and 37%.
Rivers, Slater, and Paolini, ‘Putting Services on the Table: the New GATT Round’, 23 Stanford J Int’l L
(1987) 13.
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If trade in services was growing in the absence of a comprehensive framework
à la GATS, why bother negotiating one? Brock,8 then United States Trade Representative (USTR), speaks of a trend of new protectionism. In his own words: ‘[i]f the trend
of increasing barriers to trade in services continues unchecked, trade opportunities
could be markedly reduced and the international trading system could be seriously
harmed’.9
The sequence here probably holds the key to understanding, in part at least, the
long-term motivations behind the GATS negotiation: technology had opened foreign
markets to some extent, by making longstanding barriers in some services sectors (essentially financial and telecoms) increasingly obsolete. In other words, technology
was making it possible for economic agents to circumvent existing barriers to entry.
Some countries (particularly developing ones) reacted by enacting (or threatening to
enact) new barriers to ensure that their control over key services sectors would not be
undermined by foreign firms accessing what they considered to be strategic sectors of
their economy. It was against this threat (or the actual imposition) of new barriers,
which run counter to the renewed liberalization impetus in OECD countries in the
early 1980s, that Brock10 wanted to rally his troops (or his troops want him to rally).

B The US: Bring It On
It is commonplace among commentators that it was the US financial services sectors that first argued systematically in favour of a trade round that would include a
chapter on liberalization of trade in services.11 And its voice did not fall on deaf ears:
the US was experiencing substantial trade deficits at that time (the late 1970s, early
1980s), which were politically unsustainable. These deficits resulted from significant
deficits in trade in goods, which were partially offset by surplus in trade in services.12
An agreement to liberalize trade in services would buy the US government precious
political capital; indeed it would be killing two birds with one stone. Freeman believes
that the work done by the then USTR, Robert Strauss, during the Tokyo Round laid
the foundations for subsequent actions: the inclusion of services-related provisions in
three Tokyo Round agreements is evidence that the US was from day one clear on one
issue: the GATT should be the forum to host an agreement on services.13
Chief among domestic lobbies was the Coalition of Service Industries (CSI), established in 1982, which played an important role in sensitizing the US government
about the importance for the US economy of liberalizing trade in services.14 The CSI
8
9
10
11

12
13

14

Brock, supra note 4.
Eason, ‘America’s “Invisible” Trade Surplus – Exporting of Services’, Nation’s Business (Nov. 1984), at 3.
Brock, supra note 4.
Freeman, ‘The Services Sector: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, Economic Perspectives (1996) 1, at
19–21 and G. Feketekuty, International Trade in Services: an Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations (1998).
GATT Doc. SR.42/ST/19 of 18 Dec. 1986.
McCulloch, ‘International Competition in Services’, Working Paper No. 2235 (1987), NBER Working
Paper Series.
The CSI (see www.uscsi.org) includes major international companies from the banking, insurance, and
other service industries: Lang, ‘The First Five Years of the WTO: General Agreement on Trade in Services’, 31 Law and Policy in Int’l Business (1999) 801.
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originally focused on banking, insurance, and the right of establishment (of banking and insurance companies) in foreign countries – it was thus, originally at least,
contemplating the negotiation of an agreement that would liberalize foreign direct
investment rather than direct trade in services.15 The CSI gathered data, organized
conferences, engaged in extensive public lecturing, and heavily lobbied the US government to this effect. Prominent members of the services industry provided evidence
to the US Senate Finance Committee (SFC) arguing the case for a global agreement.16
John Reed of Citibank was heading one of the advisory groups organized by the United
States Trade Representative (USTR), the Services Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC),
while James Robinson, the head of American Express, was heading the Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations. Representatives from the financial services sector were
omnipresent in the trade dialogue in those days.17 Cloney, the then President of the
International Insurance Council, as well as Cohen and Morante,18 the former being
Manager of Public Affairs for the American International Group (AIG), provide evidence to this effect.
The role of American Express in getting the multilateral negotiation on trade in
services off the ground was pivotal and needs some further explanation. In Yoffie’s
account,19 the company adopted a Vince Lombardi strategy, named after the famous
college football coach and described in the following terms by Joan Spero, American
Express’s Vice President for International Corporate Affairs:
The best defence was a good offense. The company did not want to be a passive observer of
events. On the contrary the fundamental principle guiding American Express’ actions was that
‘if you don’t like the environment, you should try to change it’.20

The strategy, in operational terms, consisted of:
(a) illumination: James Robinson, Harry Freeman, and Joan Spero gave hundreds of
speeches and interviews to reputed magazines of wide circulation, such as the
Economist, Fortune, Business Week, The Washington Post, The New York Times, etc.;21

15

16
17

18

19

20
21

Feketekuty, supra note 12, mentions that key members were Shelp (from AIG, and previously the US Department of Commerce), Harry Freeman, and Joan Spero (American Express). See also Hansen, ‘Frameworks for Foreign Direct Investment’, in United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Services
and Development, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade, UN Doc. ST/CTC/95 (1989), at 161–162.
See the Appendix in Feketekuty, supra note 12.
E.H. Preeg, Traders in a Brave New World: The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading
System (1995), at 53. S. Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System: Who’s on First? (1997); Ostry, ‘Convergence and Sovereignty: Policy Scope for Compromise?’, in A. Prakash and J.A. Hart (eds), Coping with
Globalization, (2000), at 52–96; and Ostry, ‘Trade, Development, and the Doha Development Agenda’,
in D. Lee and R. Wilkinson (eds), The WTO After Hong Kong (2007), at 26–33, suggests that for the US
services was crucial in sustaining support for multilateralism.
Cohen and Morante, ‘Elimination of Non Tariff Barriers to Trade in Services: Recommendations for
Future Negotiations’, 13 L and Policy in Int’l Business (1981) 13.
Yoffie, ‘Trade in Services and American Express’, in D.B. Yoffie, International Trade and Competition: Cases
and Notes in Strategy and Management (1990), at 367–386.
Ibid., at 375.
Spero, ‘Tear Down Barriers to Export of Services’, New York Times, 30 July 1991.
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(b) b
 uilding up the domestic lobby: the CSI, mentioned above, was established in
1982 at the initiative of American Express, along with Bechtel, Peat Marwick,
Citibank and some other firms operating in the banking sector;
(c) building bridges between the CSI and other services lobbies around the world; and
(d) influencing the US government through direct links: besides participation in entities like SPAC mentioned above, in 1982, James Robinson was one of the six
private sector members of the US delegation to the GATT meetings (that led all
the way to the Ministerial Conference which we discuss infra).22
Why did American Express invest so much energy and resources in this discussion?
At the time, the company was specializing in travellers’ cheques, charge cards, insurance, and investment services. This business depends on the rapid transmission
of large amounts of data across national borders through sophisticated computer
and telecommunications networks. Trans-border data flows, essential in fact to international banking and financial services, were threatened by protection, and so was
data processing. Clearly, this was of utmost importance to American Express. The
rationale for protection varied across countries: privacy reasons, protection of strategic sectors, infant industry, and employment.23 A new agreement regulating trade
in services should aim at disciplining the rationale for protection, opening up trade on
a worldwide basis.24
The US, quite aware of its potential in the services sector, and having experienced
itself the gains from deregulation of various services markets, saw no reason why its
own experience could not be emulated worldwide.25 Based on this conviction, the US
made a negotiation on services the flagship of its national agenda for a new GATT
multilateral round. In 1985, as the time for the launching of the new round was
approaching, the then USTR, Clayton Yeutter, had even conditioned the participation of the US in the Uruguay Round upon the inclusion of a negotiation on trade in
services in the agenda.26

22
23

24
25

26

Yoffie, supra note 20, at 367 and 375ff.
Gibbs, ‘Means to Enhance the Competitive Position and Export Capacity of Service Industries of Developing Countries’, in United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Services and Development, The
Role of Foreign Direct Investment and Trade, UN Doc. ST/CTC/95 (1989), at 104–107.
Yoffie, supra note 20, at 378.
The Airlines (1978), Trucking (road transport) (1980), Railroads (railways) (late 1970s and 1980),
Telecommunications (1977 and, as mentioned, 1982), Cable Television (late 1970s, and 1984), Brokerage (1975), Banking (1980, and 1982), Petroleum (1979), and Natural Gas Industries (1978) were
liberalized in that period: see Winston, ‘Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists’,
31 J Economic Literature (1993) 1263. On AT &T and its break-up see Cowhey and Richards, ‘Dialing for
Dollars: Institutional Designs for the Globalization of the Market for Basic Telecommunications Services,
in Prakash and Hart, supra note 18, at 148–169. See also Spar and Yoffie, ‘A Race to the Bottom or Governance from the Top?’, in A. Prakash and J.A. Hart (eds), Coping with Globalization (2000), at 31, 33ff.
‘Yeutter Cites Preconditions on Trade Talks’, J Commerce (9 Dec. 1985), at 3A.
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C The EU: CAP, Non Negotiable, Well . . . Maybe
When it came to forming a negotiating position, the EU27 saw the issue differently.
To start with, although the EU Treaty contained detailed provisions regarding its internal liberalization of trade in services, it was far from being an integrated services
market in the early 1980s.28 However, from a bureaucratic point of view, the EU did
not have competence to speak with one voice on all services. Indeed, Opinion 1/94
(by the European Court of Justice, ECJ) which was issued several years later, at the
end of the Uruguay Round, clarified that only services supplied without any physical
movement of either the supplier or the customer came under the exclusive competence
of the EU.29
But there is another, probably more persuasive reason explaining why the EU
adopted a defensive stance at the beginning of the process: according to Paemen and
Bentsch,30 the EU wanted to avoid finger pointing against its own farm policy; being
aggressive in the services context could have provoked an aggressive attitude against
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which it wanted, initially at least, to
defend at any price. This would explain why the EU was not initially a demandeur
for a round in general, never mind trade in services. The link between negotiations
on farm trade and services trade is evident in the Decision adopted by the Council of
Ministers on 19 March 1985, urging the European negotiators participating in the
Uruguay Round to safeguard the CAP while encouraging meaningful negotiations
in services.31
Defending the CAP was therefore an overriding objective. However, as we will
see later, the EU gradually shifted positions during the Uruguay Round, becoming a
demandeur of services liberalization and key participant in the actual drafting of the
agreement. What explained the change in the mood in the EU? There is probably no
dominant explanation. The EU must have felt that it would have been awkward to
incur the political cost of blocking altogether a round in the name of the protection
of its internal farm market. On the other hand, a series of national studies that saw
the light of day in the GATT in the early to mid-1980s unveiled the importance of the
services economy to EU bureaucrats.32
Contrary to their US counterparts, European service industries took more time
to get organized. Save for some groups at the national level (notably in Britain and

27

28

29

30

31
32

Throughout this article the term EU (European Union) is used as equivalent to all historical denominations (EEC, EC, etc,) of the European integration process. Numerous discussions with Jonathan Arkell,
John Richardson, and Jonathan Scheele on this point are acknowledged.
The extra-EU services grew faster than their intra-EU counterpart in the period 1979–1984: GATT Doc.
MTN.GNS/W/23 of 30 Oct. 1987.
In Opinion 1/08 [2009] ECR I–11129, the ECJ held that services are a shared competence between Member States and the EU.
H. Paemen and A. Bentsch. From the GATT to the WTO, The European Community in the Uruguay Round
(1985), at 32ff.
Ibid., at 45ff.
Drake and Nicolaidis, ‘Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: “Trade in Services” and the Uruguay
Round’, 43 Int’l Org (1992) 46, at 57.
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Sweden), European services lobbies were not set up until 1986.33 The European Community Services Group (ECSG), which represented services exporters in the EU and
the EFTA (European Free Trade Association), was set up at the invitation of the European Commission in 1986. It was composed mainly of national chambers of commerce, employers’ federations, and national services coalitions such as the Liberalisation of Trade in Services (LOTIS) committee of the British Invisible Exports Council.34
The Banking and Insurance Associations and the Fédération des Experts Comptables
Européens were also among the important lobbies.
There is evidence of coordination between the EU and North American interests during the Uruguay Round: for example, Arkell35 makes reference to the US Chamber of
Commerce in Brussels (which represents US affiliates based in the EU), and the US and
Canadian CSIs having been guests of the ECSG, and there is further evidence of joint
missions of the US, British, Australian, Swedish, and Hong Kong CSIs to Geneva.36
It should come as no surprise that the EU bureaucracy was fully behind the negotiation of an agreement. For the EU Commission, trade was the only area where the EU
could reaffirm its persona at the international plane, since the EU enjoyed no competence in any other field of international relations and trade was the area where it could
speak with one voice. Granted, it was unclear whether the EU had competence on
services. This would not, however, stop the EU Commission from pushing the agenda
further: adding services in the trade agenda would augment its competences and its
relative position towards the Council in the inter-agency game. It was also clear that
even the more developed bureaucracies, such as the EU Commission, had not become
prepared for this type of negotiation before – and well into – the 1980s.37
Bhagwati38 mentions three other factors contributing to this change of mood in
Brussels:
(a) b
 esides services, the EU must have been well aware of gains in other areas, especially in new areas such as TRIPs (trade-related intellectual property rights). The
EU TRIPs lobbies were certainly pushing for participation in the new round;

33

34
35

36

37

38

Pou Serradel, ‘La Comisión y las Nuevas Políticas para el Sector Servicios’, Información Comercial Española, No. 831, July–Aug. 2006. The two mentioned national groups were the Swedish Coalition of Service
Industries in Sweden, and ‘British Invisibles’ in Britain. The latter originated in the Committee on Invisible Exports, set up in Apr. 1968 by the Bank of England, and later became the British Invisible Exports
Council. Later, this Council established the Liberalization of Trade in Services (LOTIS) Committee. ‘British
Invisibles’ is now International Financial Services London (IFSL).
Confederation of trade association representing the British services industries.
J. Arkell, The Role of Services in Socio-economic Transformation and the Integration of Western and Eastern
Europe (1990).
Ibid.; Woll, ‘Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom?’ (Mimeo, 2007). See
also Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce Bulletin, Following-up on GATS Negotiations (Sept. 1990).
Pou Serradell, supra note 33, explains that the EU policy originated within an intra-EU Commission
group, set up in 1982, called ITS (International Trade in Services), chaired by DG External Relations. In
June 1989, the ITS group presented a report to the Commission where the main lines of an external policy on services are sketched.
Bhagwati, ‘Aggressive Unilateralism: an Overview’, in J. Bhagwati and H.T. Patrick (eds), Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System (1990), at 33.
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(b) the need to put a stop to US regionalism also played a role. President Reagan was
in favour of a new round, but under certain conditions. His message to his team
was ‘if these negotiations are not initiated or if insignificant progress is made, I
am instructing our trade negotiators to explore regional and bilateral agreements with other nations’;39
(c) the US Congress was getting into a protectionist mood: although the Jenkins Bill
on textiles was voted down, there was fear that similar initiatives would soon see
the light of day.40
Approximately at the same time, under the Single European Act, the EU was negotiating the completion of its own single market. Although the objectives of the EU single
market and the new multilateral round were not the same (far from it), still the EU
agent entrusted with the task of negotiating at the international plane (i.e., the Commission) benefited from cross-fertilization in light of the similarity of the instruments
used in the two processes.41

D Other OECD Members: A Measured Yes
OECD members were in favour of the negotiation. Capling’s42 account of the Australian participation in the Uruguay Round points to an attitude that resembles more
that of the EU than that of the US:
(a) the willingness to continue protecting Australian culture through local content
requirements in broadcasting;
(b) the uncertainty as to the coverage of the eventual agreement (fearing that the US
could be excluding sectors of export interest to Australia);
(c) the suspicion that the US was diverting attention from the ‘real issues’, that is,
the opening up of farm markets; and
(d) finally, because Australian lobbies were not demandeurs for such negotiation.
The change in attitude was due, in her view, to the fact that the government was
eventually persuaded by the epistemic community that there were real advantages
in the opening up of services markets (both at the national and the international
levels). Moreover, the Australian Coalition of Services Industries (ACSI), established
in 1987, lobbied for an agreement.43 New Zealand, following de-regulation of its
national market, sided with those requesting the opening-up of trade in services,
its main (export) interest being in professional services.44 Canada was aware of its
export potential in some services, but quite unwilling to open up others, like audio-

39
40
41

42
43

44

Preeg, supra note 18, at 51.
Waelbroeck, ‘International Trade in Services: a Comment’, in Giarini (ed.), supra note 3, at 54–57.
Ehlermann and Campogrande, ‘Rules on Services in the EEC: A Model for Negotiating World-Wide
Rules?’, in Petersmann and Hilf (eds), supra note 5, at 481–498.
A. Capling, Australia and the Global Trade System: From Havana to Seattle (2001), at 149.
Already in 1990, the Australian CSI is quoted as having the intention of joining its counterparts from the
US, etc., in a joint mission to Geneva to support the conclusion of the GATS (see Bulletin, supra note 37).
The comment made in supra note 44 also applies to the New Zealand CSI.
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visuals.45 Japan was a net importer of services but very much interested in negotiating a multilateral framework to liberalize trade.46 Traditionally a free-trade minded
country, and supported by an active CSI, Sweden was one of the fervent advocates of
services negotiations from the start, and contributed to them throughout the process,
particularly in the sectors of export interest, such as financial and maritime transport
services.

E Developing Countries: The S Word
Developing countries reluctantly accepted services as part of the Uruguay Round
agenda. At first, they adamantly refused to enter into any negotiation on this
issue.47 The promoters behind this hard line were the countries forming the G-5
(or gang of five), that is, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia. They were
hostile to the negotiations altogether and would not even bow to the temptation
to use liberalization of their services markets as a quid pro quo for the opening up of
the OECD countries’ textiles markets: in their eyes, the multi-fibre arrangement was
an illegal act altogether, and they saw no reason to pay for its dismantlement. In
addition, because of their scarce negotiating resources, they would find it difficult
simultaneously to follow negotiations on the traditional GATT agenda (which comprised farm and textiles goods) and on services.48 Moreover, contrary to the position
with developing countries, there was no developing-country lobby pushing for services
negotiations.
Developing countries also advanced that another ‘S’ word should guide negotiations: it should be ‘one fundamental principle to guide all phases in our collective
endeavour’, that is, ‘solutions . . . by definition must be compatible with . . . sovereignty’.49 They wanted to avoid their economies being effectively controlled by foreigners.50 Some (at least self-proclaimed) developing countries were quite favourable to
the negotiations though: Hong Kong China and Singapore, financial centres of prominence, welcomed the idea.51

45
46
47

48
49

50

51

M. Hart, A Trading Nation (2002), at 398.
GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/18 of 29 Nov. 1988, at para. 8.
GATT Docs. MDF/26 and 27; G.C. Hufbauer and J. Schott, Trading for Growth, The Next Round of Trade
Negotiations (1987), at 69ff.
There were voices to the opposite in academia: see Schott and Mazza, supra note 6.
GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/W/3, at para. 10, emphasis added, and Sapir, ‘Trade in Services: Policy Issues for
the Eighties’, 17 Columbia J World Business (1982) 77.
Gibbs and Ognitsev, ‘International Trade’, in United Nations (ed.), Beyond Conventional Wisdom in Development Policy, An Intellectual History of UNCTAD 1964–2004 (2004), at 3–15.
Rivers, Slater and Paolini, supra note 9, at 19. On Singapore’s strategy see Mun Heng and Low, ‘GATT
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Singapore’s Perspectives’, 2 Asian Econ J (1988) 192. As of 1990, Hong
Kong would be further supported by its CSI.
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F The Epistemic Community
There were some voices arguing in favour of an agreement,52 and chief among them
was the London-based Trade Policy Research Centre (TPRC), founded in 1968 by an
Australian economist, Hugh Corbet, one of the pioneers of the study of trade and investment in services.53 Other fora gradually developed. The Services World Forum
(SWF), set up in Geneva in 1986, was an independent forum where academics,
policy-makers, and members of the GATT Secretariat attempted to conceptualize a
negotiation on trade in services.54 Its President, Orio Giarini, managed to persuade
not only people like Geza Feketekuty (USTR), Claude Barfield (Consultant, USTR, and
then a member of the American Enterprise Institute, AEI), Albert Bréssand (who later
founded Promethée, another forum that was active in the discussion of trade issues),
but also international bureaucrats from the GATT Secretariat and UNCTAD. Drake
and Nicolaidis55 probably got it right when they concluded that the epistemic community did not substantially influence the drafting of specific GATS provisions, but
provided useful comments that helped negotiators understand what was at stake.

G The Road to Punta del Este
The main stages are the following:
(a) in 1982 the GATT Ministerial Decision called for national studies on the importance of trade in services to be conducted by those willing and opened the door to
their examination in the 1984 session;
(b) following the rejection of the US proposal to establish a Working Party on Services, the so-called Jaramillo Group (an informal group presided over by Colombian Ambassador Felipe Jaramillo with participation open to all GATT contracting
parties) sees the light of day, and it is in this context that the national services
studies submitted in accordance with the 1982 Ministerial Decision were
examined;
(c) in 1984, the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES institutionalized an information
exchange mechanism (in essence, the review of national studies) and ipso facto
the Jaramillo Group.56

52

53

54
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A.V. Deardorff, Comparative Advantage and International Trade and Investment in Services (1984); Hindley
and Smith, ‘Comparative Advantage and Trade in Services’, 7 The World Economy (1984) 369; Ethier
and Horn, ‘Services in International Trade’, in E. Helpman and A. Razin (eds), International Trade and
Trade Policy (1991), at 223–244; Richardson, ‘A Sub-sectorial Approach to Services’ Trade Theory’, in
Giarini (ed.), supra note 3, at 59–82.
Feketekuty, supra note 12. The Trade Policy Research Centre published a number of services-related
studies by Robert Baldwin, and Brian Hindley.
Drake and Nicolaidis, supra note 33, at 61. See also www.ucd.ie/sirc/swfintro.html.
Ibid., at 97ff.
CONTRACTING PARTIES: expressed all in caps, this term refers to the highest organ of the GATT with
the substantial authority to adopt acts by GATT organs, modify the agreement, launch trade negotiations, etc.
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The negative attitude of hard-line developing countries was such that the national
services studies ended up being examined in an informal group. As of November
1985, 16 such studies had been circulated and examined.57
In 1985, the US made its intentions clear:
Our objective in services negotiations would be the establishment of a legal framework of rules
and procedures that would (1) make trade in services as open as possible through a commitment to transparency of practices and the resolution of problems through consultation, and (2)
negotiate commitments of a sectoral or functional character dealing with problems unique to
individual services industries.58

In September 1985, the US formally requested an extraordinary session of the
GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES, which was finally held between 30 September and
2 October that year.59 A Senior Officials’ Group (SOG) was then established to discuss
the modalities of a new round. This group did not manage to produce something concrete regarding trade in services but kept the discussion on the new round alive.60
During the same time, the ECSG, made its position on the services negotiation in the
next round clear to the EU Commission.
Encouraged by a number of delegations, Arthur Dunkel, the Director General (DG)
of the GATT, decided to turn to some eminent persons in an effort to provide some
extra intellectual legitimacy to the voices calling for a new round.61 The group was
composed of seven personalities: Bill Bradley (US Senator and member of the Senate
Finance Committee, SFC); Pehr Gyllenhammar (Chairman of Volvo); Guy Ladreit de
Lacharrière (Vice President of the International Court of Justice, ICJ); Fritz Leutwiler
(Chairman of the Swiss National Bank, and President of the Bank for International
Settlements); I.G. Patel (London School of Economics); Mario Henrique Simonsen (ex
Minister of Finance for Brazil); and Sumito Djojohadikusumo (ex Minister of Trade
and Industry of Indonesia). The group produced the Leutwiler report, named after the
group’s chairman. It did not address the merits of negotiating an agreement on trade
in services in any meaningful detail, but provided those arguing in this sense with an
encouragement through its advocacy of trade liberalization.62
At the 41st session of the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES, a Preparatory Committee was established to determine the objectives, modalities, subject-matter, and participation of the new round.63
57
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Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. The GATT Secretariat prepared
an analytical summary of information exchanged on services, contained in GATT document MDF/7/
Rev. 2, dated 25 Nov. 1985. Reyna, ’Services’, in T.P. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: a Negotiating History (1993), at 1, states that a total of 18 studies were circulated.
GATT Doc. L/5838 of 9 July 1985.
Bradley, ’Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying
the Foundations’, 23 Stanford J Int’l L (1987) 57, at 78. The GATT Council (GATT Doc. BISD 9S, at 8–9)
was deciding by consensus.
Bradley, supra note 59, at 79.
In 1958 as well, a group of experts was established under the chairmanship of Gottfried Haberler (Harvard) : GATT Doc. L/794/Add. 1 of 14 Mar. 1958.
J. Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System (1995), at 19–20.
GATT Doc. BISD 32, at 10, and Croome, supra note 62, at 27.
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3 The Negotiation of the GATS (1986–1994)
A Launching the Round: Punta del Este (1986)
Negotiators met in Punta del Este, a few miles off Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay,
with the intention of launching the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations.64
Simmonds65 reports that the inclusion in the agenda of the Uruguay Round of a negotiating item on trade in services was still unresolved when the Draft Ministerial Declaration was submitted to Ministers in June 1986. Two coalitions played an important
role in Punta del Este:66 the G-10 (a partnership of developing countries), and the socalled Café au Lait group, which included both industrial and developing countries.
The leading developing countries (Brazil, India, Yugoslavia) were all part of G-10
and were staunchly opposed to the inclusion of services in the round. The Café au Lait
marked the first time that dividing lines between developed and developing countries
fell.
The G-10 position was in fact jeopardizing the launch of the round. However, two
events helped unblock the deadlock:
(a) the US pressure;
(b) the Café au Lait group put together a compromise which managed to gather momentum and provided the basis for the eventual agreement.

1 G-10: It is No
G-10 is the heir to G-5, its expanded version. It comprised the original G-5 (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Yugoslavia), and the following developing countries: Cuba,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, and Tanzania.67 Continuing with the line drawn by the G-5
(described supra), the G-10 refused to accept any negotiation on trade in services. On
23 June and 16 July 1986, the G-10 presented two draft Ministerial Declarations, as
well as an addendum on 22 July. In all these drafts, it rejected the idea of including
trade in services in the new multilateral agenda, considering that time was not yet
ripe for such an inclusion.68
Srinivasan and Tendulkar69 partly attribute this attitude to the fact that Brazil and
India lagged behind other developing countries when it came to domestic reforms (privatization, etc.): both countries started economic reform processes in 1991, that is,
64

65
66

67
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69

Richardson, ‘What Really Happened at Punta del Este, Understanding the Framework of the Uruguay
Round’, in Riddle (ed.), supra note 3, at 202–213; Winham, ‘Pre-negotiation Phase of the Uruguay
Round’, 44 Int’l J (1989) 280. Murray Gibbs graciously shared his experience on the beginning of the
negotiation with us.
Simmonds, ‘The Community and the Uruguay Round’, 25 CM L Rev (1988) 95, at 96.
Tussie and Lengyel, ‘Developing Countries: Turning Participation into Influence’, in B. Hoekman, A.
Mattoo, and P. English (eds), Development, Trade, and the WTO (2002), at 485–492; A. Narlikar, International Trade and Developing Countries: Coalitions in GATT and the WTO (2003).
Rivers, Slater, and Paolini, supra note 8, at 20.
GATT Doc. PREP. COM (86) W/41; W/41/Rev. 1; and W/41/Rev. 1/Add. 1.
T.N. Srinivasan and S.D. Tendulkar, Reintegrating India with the World Economy (2003).
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half way through the Uruguay Round. At the time of Punta del Este they were both
still living within the confines of the old statist paradigm.

2 US Pressure
In June 1986, the US tabled a concrete proposal for a Ministerial Declaration which
included clear terms for a negotiation on trade in services.70 At the same time, the
USTR Clayton Yeutter publicly announced that the US would turn to bilateral and
plurilateral arrangements, instead of the GATT, if the trading nations did not agree
on including the necessary subjects in the agenda of the Uruguay Round in particular
services.71 Moreover, one should not neglect the potential impact of unilateral action
under section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, which allowed the US administration
to take retaliatory action against countries imposing or maintaining unreasonable
restrictions on US services exports.72 Developing countries were facing the following
dilemma: either continue to say ‘no’ to the US requests for negotiating a multilateral
framework on trade in services, and retain their freedom to define unilaterally the
regulation of their services markets,73 but at the risk of being sanctioned by the US; or
enter into services negotiations in the GATT and try to constrain as much as possible
the possibility for the US to act unilaterally.74 Under the circumstances, it should not
come as a surprise that some developing countries chose the latter.75 Almost every
account of the negotiations in Punta del Este points to the fact that the US, and more
precisely its USTR, Clayton Yeutter, was one of the decisive factors in pushing services
into the agenda of the Uruguay Round.76

3 Café au Lait: The Gordian Knot Untied
In Narlikar’s account, the rationale for the formation of the Café au Lait group was
provided by the need to respond to the question whether to include services within
the GATT. The Café au Lait group owes its existence to the 1982 Ministerial Conference: since initially there was no centralized mechanism to conduct exchange

70
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GATT Doc. PREP. COM(86)W/4 of 11 June 1986.
‘Yeutter Takes Tough Line on Upcoming GATT Talks’, Los Angeles Times, 11 Sept. 1986; Raghavan,
‘Financial Services, the WTO, and Initiatives for Global Financial Reform’, G-24 Working Paper (2009),
Washington, DC; Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Programme, 1983, Washington DC: Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR, 1994).
The US initiated 6 cases in 1985, some of which directly concerned trade in services.
Hodge, ‘Liberalization of Trade in Services in Developing Countries’, in Hoekman, Mattoo, and English
(eds), supra note 67, at 221–234.
Under s. 301, the US might find other countries’ regulation of services unreasonable or unjustifiable, and
might subject it to sanctions.
Cohen and Morante, supra note 20, at 504.
Paemen and Bentsch, supra note 31, at 39ff. and 59ff; Gibbs, and Mashayekhi, ‘Development in the Uruguay Round Negotiations’ in M. Gibbs and M. Mashayekhi, Trade in Services, Services in Asia and Pacific:
Selected Papers, Volume Two (1991), UNCTAD/ITP/151, UNCTAD/UNDP: Geneva; Kasahara, ‘Services in
Development’, 5 in Beyond Conventional Wisdom in Development Policy, An Intellectual History of UNCTAD
1964–2004 (2004), at 119–125.
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of information, some developing countries decided to join forces with industrialized
nations and pursued this mandate informally. Felipe Jaramillo presided over the group’s
meetings.
There was no firewall between the Café au Lait group and the G-10: initially, the
latter participated in the meetings organized by Ambassador Jaramillo, but over time
stopped participating in the meetings, and proposed a draft Ministerial Declaration
that made no mention of services.77 In reaction to these events, the remaining participants in the Jaramillo process came together in the so-called G-20. The G-20 consisted
of Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Hong Kong China, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Zambia, and Zaire. The G-20 liaised with the G-9, a group
of developed countries composed of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Under the leadership of Colombia and
Switzerland, the group prepared a draft78 which became the basis for the talks during
the Punta del Este Ministerial Conference.
The Café au Lait group overcame the North–South divide, and in that it was unprecedented. It presented itself as a bridge-building coalition engaged in mediation-type
diplomacy in the space provided by the extreme positions of the US and G-10.
Despite belonging to the G-10, Argentina proposed an alternative draft Declaration
where ‘services’ was included in the agenda, but intellectual property and investment
were not.79 What made Argentina change its mind? The country was definitely not
the main target of section 301 initiatives by the US, so one could hardly make the
argument that it bowed down to US pressure. Hamilton and Whalley80 offer the following explanation:
Argentina, fearing implications for its agricultural interests in the round proposed a third draft
which it hoped would bridge the gap between what had now become a solidly supported SwissColombia proposal from the EFTA process and the G 1O text. The Chairman of the Preparatory
Committee forwarded these three texts of a possible declaration to the Ministers at Punta del
Este. However, the effort on the third text came too late and was not given serious consideration.

From a negotiating perspective, the link between services and agriculture made by
Argentina was neither unique nor unreasonable (the EU had made the same link but
for different reasons, as we saw supra).

4 End Game: Game On (on Separate Track)
The decision to initiate the negotiations on liberalization of trade in services was taken
in Punta del Este in an ad hoc intergovernmental meeting, parallel to the session of

77
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Narlikar, supra note 66.
GATT Doc. PREP. COM (86)W/47/Rev. 2, of 30 July 1986.
GATT Doc. PREP. COM (86)W/49 of 30 July 1986.
Hamilton and Whalley, ‘Coalitions in the Uruguay Round: The Extent, Pros and Cons for Developing
Country Participation’, Working Paper No. 2751, NBER Working Paper Series (1988) (2 vols), ii, at 18.
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the CONTRACTING PARTIES.81 A separate track was the maximum Brazil and India
could accept:82 one track on trade in goods, and another one on services.83 The G-10
countries were quick to point to the separation between the goods and the services
negotiations.84 The inclusion, however, of both issues in the same Ministerial Declaration and the institutional link through the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC)
would remove de facto the pretended firewall between the two tracks.85

B From Punta del Este to Geneva: The Players
GATS services negotiators understood the mandate originating in the Punta del Este
Ministerial Declaration as two-fold:
(a) to establish a framework of principles and rules for trade in services;
(b) to elaborate possible disciplines for individual sectors.86
The US seems to be at the origin of this distinction. In its view, this issue was intimately linked to the relevance of GATT principles for trade in services: the general
framework would thus encompass the GATT principles (that were judged relevant,
preliminarily at least), which would then be further developed to cater for sector specificities.87
81
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GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/W/3, at paras 4 and 5.
Randhawa, ‘Punta del Este and After: Negotiations on Trade in Services and the Uruguay Round’, 21 J
World Trade L (1987) 63, at 164ff.
GATT/1396, 25 Sept. 1986. The TNC (Trade Negotiations Committee) would meet every 6 months, and
when meetings occurred in non-ministerial sessions it would be chaired by DG Dunkel. Three bodies
were established and were hierarchically below the TNC: the GNS (Group of Negotiations on Services),
the GNG (Group of Negotiations on Goods), and the SB (Surveillance Body). See Marconini, ‘The Uruguay
Round Negotiations on Services: an Overview’, in B.M. Hoekman, P. Messerlin, and K. Sauvant (eds), The
Uruguay Round: Services in the World Economy (1990), at 19–41. The GNS held its first meeting on 27 Oct.
1986 under the chairmanship of Ambassador F. Jaramillo (Colombia): see GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/1 of 3
Nov. 1986.
MTN.GNS/W/3. Shukla, ‘From GATT to WTO and Beyond’, The UN University, World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Working Paper No. 195 (2000), at 17ff, the then Indian Ambassador, explains that while Ministers were meeting in Punta del Este, secret negotiations were being
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McCulloch, ‘Services and the Uruguay Round’, 13 The World Economy (1990) 329, at 345–346, argues
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South’. See Conconi and Perroni, ‘Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in International Negotiations’, 57 J Int’l
Economics (2002) 423.
GATT Doc. MTN. GNS/3 of 23 Dec. 1986.
Rivers, Slater, and Paolini, supra note 8, at 23ff; Jackson, ‘Constructing a Constitution for Trade in Services’, 11 The World Economy (1988) 187; Jackson, ‘The Constitutional Structure for International Cooperation in Trade in Services and the Uruguay Round of the GATT’, in R.M. Stern (ed.), The Multilateral
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Besides the GNS, which was the main forum for negotiating on trade in services, and
where all GATT contracting parties participated, the negotiators established later on a
number of sectoral working groups which were meeting regularly and submitted periodically reports to the GNS. 88 These groups were: labour mobility, construction and
engineering services, maritime transport services, land transport services, air transport services, telecommunications services, and financial services (including insurance). Participation in all these groups was open to all Uruguay Round participants.

1 The US
The US wanted a meaningful comprehensive agreement in services: meaningful in
terms of liberalization, and comprehensive in terms of sector coverage and participation. 89 Although the possibility for variable geometry was not totally excluded ab
initio, the US wished to include all Uruguay Round participants in the negotiation and
was to this effect, prepared to make concessions to least developed countries (LDCs)
in order to facilitate their participation. It was opposed, however, to widespread free
riding and was not prepared to extend this courtesy to developing countries that did
not qualify as LDCs.90 The (eventual) GATS should, in the US view, be a multilateral
agreement where everybody, except for the LDCs, would be requested to make a substantial liberalization effort.91

2 The EU
The distribution of competences across the EU and its Member States was, as we alluded
to supra, uncertain at the moment the Uruguay Round was launched. It was clarified
at the end of the round, when the EU jointly requested an opinion from the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) on this matter. Although sitting in the driver’s seat, and acting as if it was fully competent, throughout the round the EU agent, the Commission,
was on a tight leash: its negotiating positions were not only ex ante decided but also
ex post scrutinized by the EU Member States. De facto, however, this does not seem to
have been a major impediment.92 Moreover, a positive external effect stemmed from
the intra-EU distribution of competences: the common agent, the Commission, had to
report back to 12 Member States with divergent interests. The EU kept very comprehensive and detailed records of each and every discussion, participated in practically
all meetings, and emerged as a key player in the negotiations.
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GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/36/Add. 1 of 24 July 1990.
Self,‘International Discussions on Trade in Services: The Perspective of Developed Countries’, in UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, supra note 3, at 167–169; Hindley, ‘International Trade in Services:
a Comment’, in Giarini (ed.), supra note 3, at 35–39, mentions that originally the US government toyed
with the idea of concessions only in non-factor services, that is, services that can be supplied from a supplier in country A to a buyer in country B without relocation of either seller or buyer.
Paemen and Bentsch, supra note 31, at 132ff.
Berg, ‘Trade in Services: Toward a “Development Round” of GATT Negotiations Benefiting Both Developing and Industrialized States’, 28 Harvard J Int’l L (1987) 1, at 14ff.
Pou Serradell, supra note 34.
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The EU was in favour of a comprehensive agreement as well.93 Its overall negotiating objective was to a considerable extent a function of its willingness to preserve
the CAP.

3 Other OECD Countries
Apart from the US and the EU, the most active OECD countries were Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland.94 Other OECD countries with
high stakes, notably the UK, would channel their interests through the EU Commission. They had more or less similar strategies: they were all in favour of including
some specific sectors, while being adamant on excluding others. Unfortunately, their
‘ins’ and ‘outs’ were not identical, and this was one of the factors that made the negotiation on MFN quite hard: if only the few sectors where everybody could agree to
be part of the ’ins’ had been included in the agreement, then the bite of (an eventual)
MFN discipline would have been severely curtailed.95

4 Developing Countries
Developing countries were divided into two camps. On one side, the reluctant players,
that is, those that believed that there was not much in these negotiations for them and
that saw no reason why the negotiation should take place in the first place.96 Which
services could they export to the rest of the world? They held that their competitive
advantage was in goods, not in services.97 And those services of interest to them (like
tourism) were liberalized anyway. They adopted a passive – if not obstructive – attitude towards the negotiations, at least early on.98 Nobody better than the then Indian
Ambassador Shukla to sum up the way they felt following the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration:
In the negotiations that led to Punta del Este, developing countries were able to ensure that
their concerns were taken into account in the following manner. First, the respect of the policy
objectives behind national regulations was explicitly recognized in the Punta del Este mandate,
which to a great extent alleviated the fears of developing countries. Second, development was
stated as the ultimate goal of the negotiations, in other words whatever rules and disciplines
were to emerge should promote the development of developing countries. Thus, the recognition
of the development objective was to meet the concern that the element of equity could be
ignored or inequity increased, as a result of the negotiations. Finally, the subject matter of the
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Gill, ‘The Uruguay Round: Perspectives from Latin America’, in Riddle (ed.), supra note 3, at 184–188.
Kierzkowski, ‘International Trade in Services: a Comment’, in Giarini (ed.), supra note 3, at 39–43; Sapir,
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negotiations was defined as ‘trade in services’, which meant some kind of narrowing down of
the scope of negotiations. If a broad coverage had been intended, the mandate would have been
framed in terms of negotiations on services or negotiations on transactions of services. Instead,
the Ministerial Declaration refers to trade, which is natural for a forum that basically deals
with trade matters and not with the whole body of transactions that are associated with any
economic activity. Those are the basic principles of the Punta del Este Declaration, which were
designed to take care of the concerns of developing countries. It is interesting that the mandate
does not speak of liberalization per se as the goal of negotiations. It aims at expansion of trade,
not liberalization, of expansion of trade as an instrument for the growth of all trading partners
and for the development of developing countries. That is the central goal of the multinational
framework that must evolve.99

On the other side there were the Café au Lait participants who, from the early stages,
participated actively in the negotiating process. This group included such GATT members as Hong Kong China, which became over time an active participant in the services negotiations, vigorously supported by an organized CSI as of 1990.

5 The various coalitions
We have already made reference to the Café au Lait group and the crucial role it played
in successfully unblocking the deadlock back in Punta del Este. The group survived
in various versions – sometimes referred to as the Friends of Services Group – but had
minimal visibility and minimal successes to its credit. It seems thus fair to conclude
that the Café au Lait group was instrumental in launching the round but did not have
much influence on the shaping of the GATS.
Besides this group, there were informal gatherings of delegations:
(a) The Rolle Group, under the initiative of Meg McDonald (Australian delegate to
the GATT), and composed of Australia, Canada, Hong Kong China, Hungary,
Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland, with
additional countries included at a later stage;
(b) The Hôtel de la Paix Group, named after the famous lakeside hotel in Geneva,
which was a gathering of services experts, and eventually of experts in financial services. Ambassadors Jaramillo and Pierre-Louis Girard (Switzerland)
co-chaired this group.

6 The GATT Secretariat
The GATT Secretariat is a bureaucracy. Before the Uruguay Round, the GATT had
developed a practice whereby working groups, like negotiating groups, would be
chaired by a national delegate to the GATT. The GATT Secretariat would assist the
chair and the groups in various ways, by preparing documents clarifying conceptual
issues or ‘taking stock’ of the various opinions expressed, by reviewing the state of
statistics regarding trade in services, and even by developing ideas about the shape of
the agreement and providing definitions and drafting alternatives. In short, it was an
99
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active participant throughout the process. It is worth recalling that, with few exceptions, there was hardly any embedded expertise, either within national governments
and delegations or within international bureaucracies regarding trade in services in
1986. It is lack of expertise in many national capitals that led to reliance on the GATT
Secretariat.

C On the Way to Montreal (1986–1988): Houston, We Have a Problem
Negotiations went through many ups and downs. Schematically, this is where countries stood at Punta del Este:

Framework
Agreement’s sectoral coverage
Liberalization level

Developed countries

Café au Lait

G-10

GATT
Full
Substantial

GATT
Full
Substantial

Non-GATT
Partial
Limited

By the end of the round, the compromise reached by Uruguay Round participants,
which also reflects the more complex dimensions that characterized the negotiations,
could be summarized as follows:

Framework
Agreement’s sectoral coverage
Liberalization obligations
Liberalization level (bindings)

Developed countries

Developing countries

WTO (new)
Full
Progressive
Substantial

WTO (new)
Full
Progressive
Limited

Trading partners struggled during the initial phase of the negotiation, roughly
between Punta del Este and mid-1988:
(a) i t was clear that the development of the framework could not be supported by
reliable and systematic data on trade in services, which were missing;
(b) very little could be learned from other international agreements in the area of
services that
(c) GATT principles and concepts, such as transparency of regulations, National
Treatment (NT), Most-favoured-nation (MFN), safeguards, exceptions, were
considered useful and potentially applicable to a future agreement on trade in
services, although it was not clear how and to what extent.
By September 1988, the discussion on the issues (particularly on definitions) was at
best abstract or academic.100 Still, Jaramillo noted that substantial progress had been
made in two respects: delegations submitted proposals evidencing their interests, and
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some issues were clarified.101 During this phase we can observe the negotiating patterns of the two groups:
(a) developed countries wished to put in place an elaborate framework whereby all,
in principle, services sectors would be included;
(b) developing countries adopted a more defensive strategy: they wished to negotiate
on few services, preferably those of their own export interest, and to keep under
national control the regulation of whatever sector they consider of national
interest.
A rather unfortunate initiative of the developed countries did not help to narrow
down the gap between them and developing countries. A 1987 study prepared by the
OECD, entitled Elements of a Conceptual Framework for Trade in Services, was submitted
for consideration to the GATT. It was thwarted immediately by developing countries,
only because it had been prepared by the OECD and, consequently, they had had no
opportunity to debate it and negotiate it. Negotiations should start from a clean slate,
not from an OECD dictum, in their view.102
It is worth noting that the GATT Secretariat, through DG Dunkel, argued quite explicitly in favour of the involvement of business in the negotiations from early on. DG
Dunkel understood that business was a natural ally since its interests lay in the fast
resolution of the round and the liberalization of trade.103

D The Montreal Ministerial Conference (1988): Mid Term Review
As became the GATT practice, half way through the round (or around that time)
negotiators would meet to take stock of the progress made and agree on whatever
needed to be done in order to complete the negotiations. The text that was submitted
to the meeting was heavily bracketed104 to the point that Yeutter, the USTR, was
quoted stating that it was ‘the worst I’ve ever seen coming to a ministerial meeting’.105
Montreal was more the phase of the negotiation where the negotiation itself had
to be maintained. Unfortunately, the US adopted a hard, uncompromising line, and
developing countries refused to give in. The EU essentially saw itself as mediator between the US on the one hand and developing countries on the other. Paemen106 and
Bentsch refer to a ‘secret’ meeting at which delegates from the EU, Sweden, and a host
of developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, and Jamaica) participated
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and produced what came to be known as the weekend text.107 This text formed the
basis of the Montreal Declaration.108
The language of this document is hortatory, calling for extra efforts, agreements
to continue studying particular questions, and identifying a list of principles (such
as transparency, progressive liberalization, etc.) that were considered relevant and,
consequently, would constitute the focus of the impending negotiation. And yet – politically – something had been achieved: the number of paragraphs dedicated to trade
in services (compared with the en passant references in the Punta del Este Declaration)
was evidence that the negotiation was there to stay and that there should be no doubt
as to the resolve of the trading nations to go ahead with it; then, there was the resolve
not to leave, in principle at least, any sector outside the realm of the negotiation; and,
finally, the idea emerged first to negotiate in adequate detail the general framework
(which started to take shape) before moving to discussing the initial liberalization
commitments, i.e., the GATS concessions.

E From Montreal to the July Text: A Glimpse of Sunshine
The main issues confronting negotiators were the following:
(a) s hould the negotiations be limited to the provisions that would form an integral
part of the general framework, or should initial liberalization commitments be
negotiated?;
(b) whether the negative list or the positive list approach would ultimately carry the
day;
(c) the manner in which the initial liberalization commitments would be entered
(following the quick decision to reject a proposal by developing countries to limit
the pre-Round negotiations to the shaping of the general framework). In this
context, two questions emerged as the basic issues: first, the manner in which the
initial liberalization commitments would be entered, that is, the subject-matter of
what was eventually termed specific commitments; secondly, the manner in
which services would be traded under the (eventual) GATS, that is, the modes of
supply;
(d) the applicability of GATT principles (such as NT, MFN, etc.) to trade in specific
sectors (telecoms, construction, transport, tourism, professional, and financial
services), for which the GATT Secretariat had been asked to prepare background
papers to facilitate such assessment.109
The TNC met in April 1990, that is, four months after the Montreal meeting. Between April and July 1990, the so-called July Text was prepared and circulated.110 The
July Text is very interesting in several respects:
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(a) it was made clear that the general obligations would bind the discretion of
signatories with respect to all services covered, irrespective of whether a specific
commitment had been entered into;
(b) specific commitments could be made not only with regard to market access and
national treatment, but also with regard to ‘any other provisions to be decided
upon’;
(c) the text hints at the existence of four ‘modes of delivery’, as they used to be identified
at the time, instead of ‘modes of supply’ the term which was preferred later;
(d) the provision on Domestic Regulation imposed a necessity requirement with
respect to standards and qualifications;
(e) a framework was put into place with respect to restrictive business practices
(RBPs), which required parties to provide information (upon request) about their
own domestic economic operators whenever warranted;
Although the July Text was presented as a ‘clean’ text, several key issues remained
unresolved. Chief among them were the coverage; MFN and market access; and the
negotiation and application of specific commitments.

F From the July Text to the Brussels Meeting (December 1990): Early
Winter
Based essentially on the July Text, another text was prepared and formally submitted
to all trading partners when they met in Brussels (Brussels Ministerial Conference).111
The text was substantially bracketed but still, even within brackets, it provided a
meaningful basis for the GATS general framework. The Brussels text contained 35
provisions (just like the July Text). Basically all the GATS provisions as we now know
them, albeit not verbatim, are thematically there:
(a) the four modes of supply were already mentioned in Article I of the text; 112
(b) the exclusion of services supplied in the exercise of governmental functions (now
‘governmental authority’) appeared for the first time;
(c) the provisions on increasing the participation of developing countries were
beefed up;
(d) a provision on recognition and harmonization of regulations made its way to the
text for the first time;
(e) specific negotiating mandates were drafted for safeguards and government
procurement; and
(f)	provisions on the modification of schedules and dispute settlement were
included.
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The Brussels meeting failed over disagreements regarding the transformation of the
EU CAP. Failure to agree on farm issues ipso facto led to general failure. The doom and
gloom was back in Geneva.

G From Brussels to Geneva: The Dunkel Draft
Negotiations in the GNS context continued: the so-called Room B meetings113 multiplied and it is there that delegations attempted once again to iron out their differences
and hammer out the GATS general framework. The meetings were of course open to
all GATT contracting parties. Only some of them were physically present almost every
time (Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, the EU, Hong
Kong, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Uruguay, and the US).114
As in any negotiations, but particularly in services where new ground had to be
broken, personalities played a key role. At the risk of being unfair to others, it is clear
that three delegates almost monopolized the negotiations between the Brussels Ministerial Conference and the preparation of the Dunkel Draft: Jonathan Scheele (EU,
stationed in Brussels), Richard Self (US, originally stationed in Washington and later
on in Geneva), and B.K. Zutshi (Indian Ambassador to the GATT). They frequently
met together and with the Secretariat, and together managed to produce a number
of drafts for various key provisions that would ultimately be included in the Dunkel
Draft.115
DG Dunkel put together a text, the Dunkel Draft, which, its limited legal value notwithstanding, provided – content-wise – the basis for the eventual agreement.116 Dunkel did not think of services as a ground-breaker. Dunkel decided himself to chair the
negotiating groups on Agriculture and on Textiles, obviously holding the view that
these two groups held the key to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The
text contained no brackets. Nevertheless, the negotiations still had some way to go:
(a) fi
 rst, the absence of brackets was not tantamount to agreement between the players.
This is how DG Dunkel conceived the process: based on the confessionals and the
ongoing negotiations in Rooms B and F, he requested the various Chairs of negotiating groups to put together a text without brackets.117 The absence of brackets
could be either the outcome of negotiations (and therefore the reflection of a consensus among the parties) or simply, in the absence of consensus, upon Dunkel’s
request the personal view of the Chair regarding a particular provision. In the
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case of services, it would be in fact the view of two chairs, because, since April
1991, Ambassador Jaramillo had been assisted in his tasks by Ambassador David
Hawes (Australia), who became a sort of co-chair of the GNS, and succeeding
Jaramillo when the latter left Geneva;118
(b) secondly, the change in US attitude, and its decision to exclude maritime transport from the purview of the agreement and to take MFN exemptions in some key
sectors (financial services, basic telecoms, air transport), also pushed negotiations into a bumpy road.119 And, of course, the big brother (farm negotiations)
was not that far behind: more than ever before, services was not a self-contained
negotiation: the failure in the Dunkel Draft to bridge the gap in farm negotiations
led to additional negotiating time. Still, the services part of the Dunkel Draft looks
very much like the eventual GATS.
DG Dunkel did the multilateral system a service by sticking out his neck and signing a text which was approved by him (and his close staff) but not necessarily by all
delegates participating in the negotiations. The text represented a compromise that, in
Dunkel’s view, could carry the day. It should be noted here that little of substance was
added to the Dunkel Draft in subsequent negotiations.120

H The Gavel Goes Down (the Train Has Now Left the Station)
Eventually, and after some self-imposed (unrealistic) deadlines had been passed, following a trade-off between EU concessions in the farm sector and US additional opening of its services market,121 together with new offers from developing countries in
some sectors, the agreement on services was concluded. The new DG, Peter D. Sutherland, played an important role in bringing the overall Uruguay Round package to a
successful conclusion.122
The successful conclusion was not without some late friction though: the EU, surprisingly for many, changed its attitude on maritime transport days before the final
agreement, now requesting the exclusion of this sector from the package. This led
services negotiators back to the room where the Annex on Negotiations on Maritime
Transport Services was finally concluded. For all practical purposes, negotiations on
maritime transport were postponed for a later day, that is, after the entry into force
of the Uruguay Round package. It was thanks to this final compromise, which was
reportedly achieved one hour before the gavel in the hands of Peter D. Sutherland
marking the end of the round went down, that the GATS had been finally agreed.123
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4 Property Rights on the GATS
A All Four Have Been Quite Influential
In what follows, we trace the impact which four trading partners (Brazil, the EU, India,
and the US) had on the negotiations and on particular features of the GATS. The four
made 42 out of 95 proposals to the GNS (more than 44 per cent of the total):
(a) t hese numbers correspond to all proposals submitted by participants, irrespective
of whether they concerned the general framework (including, for example, communications on statistics) or sectoral negotiations;
(b) it is further irrelevant whether the proposals were made by individual nations or
whether they were joint proposals. In the latter case we will credit all
co-sponsors;
(c) we do not count revisions, addenda, and corrigenda to original proposals, since
they did not add anything substantive in our view.
It is probably inaccurate to state that all proposals were equally influential. It could
be the case that the proposals we have chosen to review proved to be non-influential.
This is why we entered a second criterion, that is, the parallelism in subject-matter
between the proposal and the final provision of the GATS: participation (measured
by the number of proposals) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for influence;
parallelism of subject-matter moves us closer to our objective.
We should note that the four cannot be credited with influencing decisively each
and every provision of the GATS. This was not the case. On the one hand, other participants (e.g., the Nordic countries, Japan, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Switzerland)
also submitted several communications at various stages of the negotiating process,
and some of the ideas put forward may have found their way to the final text (it is not
easy to identify who was the first one to throw up an idea). On the other hand, some
other proposals, even if they ended up in the final text, were, in our view at least, of
marginal interest: for example, it is the Nordic countries that should be credited with
the paternity (or maternity) of Article Vbis GATS which, however, is not central to the
GATS framework.
The alliance forged by Brazil and India was mainly political. Brazil and India never
submitted a joint proposal. For example, in 1989, only three weeks apart, both of
them submitted communications outlining the main elements for a services agreement: while the Brazilian one was more rhetorical, the Indian one was more pragmatic and reflected a more elaborate idea of the main elements to be included in the
framework.124

B Brazil
It is probably fair to state that Brazil ‘frontloaded’ most of its negotiating effort. It spent
a lot of negotiating capital in, first, trying to stop any discussion on services; then (when
124
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the first strategy did not work out) trying to impose a ‘firewall’ between the negotiations on goods and services; then insisting on focusing on definitions, concepts, and
statistics; and, finally, trying to limit the negotiating agenda to few items and trying to
get as much flexibility as possible as a developing country. Wahrendorff125 discusses
the Brazilian participation in the Uruguay Round, focusing on services negotiations.
He notes a clear opposition initially to negotiating services, followed by a change in
attitude after 1988 (Montreal) which allowed Brazil to become more cooperative, and
thus enabled the conclusion of the agreement, without however notably influencing
the shaping of the agreement. In other words, it was very important politically, due to
its influence on other developing countries, but not a mastermind of the agreement.
Wahrendorff attributes the change in attitude to three factors:
(a) first, some anti-globalization hardliners lost their privileges;
(b) secondly, the threat of unilateral action by the US, which, as we noted supra,
was quite serious, and made it increasingly necessary to have a multilateral deal
covering services; and
(c) thirdly, a change in key personnel. Ambassador Paulo Batista headed the Brazilian
delegation early on, and was sceptical of the GATT – he called it, like many
others, ‘a rich men’s club’. Batista was a friend of G-10, and indeed the mentor of
this group, in Wahrendorff’s view. He was replaced in 1989 by Ambassador
Rubens Ricupero, a multilateralist who believed in trade cooperation.126
Brazil probably understood, after some point in time, that its position regarding a
firewall between the negotiation on goods and that on services was water under the
bridge. Hence, the potential for trade-offs was there and Brazil could profit, along with
all the other trading nations that engaged in this practice; it could, for example, offer
the opening-up of its services market in return for the opening-up of the farm markets
of the OECD countries. It tried, however, to ensure that the negotiation on services
kept a very narrow focus, limited only to the development of a framework of rules and
principles, and leaving actual liberalization to be achieved very progressively in future
rounds of negotiations.127
Hoekman128 suggests that there are anyway only a few provisions in the GATS
of particular interest to developing countries: transparency (Article III GATS), increasing participation of developing countries (Article IV GATS), subsidies (Article XV
GATS), and progressive liberalization (Article XIX GATS). Brazil tried its hand with
respect to each one of them and specifically supported provisions regarding increasing
participation of developing countries, exceptions to the main obligations, safeguards,
and transparency, and stressed the importance of progressive liberalization as an
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overarching principle.129 It was also clear from its perspective that the new agreement should be a negative integration-scheme, that is, policies should be unilaterally
defined, and to the extent that they exhibited (negative) international external effects,
the agreement’s disciplines should come into play.130

C EU
Taking a rather long term perspective starting in the 1970s, it is probably fair to conclude that the EU was not as instrumental in preparing the ground for the services
negotiations as the US. However, the EU was indeed instrumental in shaping the final
agreement, probably benefiting from an extremely effective international bureaucracy, namely the EU Commission.
The EU’s hand can be traced in all key provisions of the GATS, such as the four modes
of supply, the exception for services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority,
domestic regulation, NT, the modification of schedules, transparency, and even sectoral
disciplines, such as the Annex on Financial Services.131 Moreover, throughout the process, the EU appeared more forthcoming about developing countries’ positions, willing
to work through the drafting to accommodate their concerns. This eventually translated, for example, in the GATS distinction between general obligations (applicable to
all service sectors) and specific commitments on market access and national treatment
(applicable only to sectors specifically chosen and identified by the country concerned).
The EU was quite vocal on institutional issues as well, such as dispute settlement.132
Being one of the most prominent service exporters, the EU was in favour of a comprehensive agreement. The only sector that the EU wanted to exclude from liberalization commitments was the audiovisual sector.133 The dispute between the EU and the
US over audiovisual services, which was resolved only a couple of days before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, proved to be the Round’s deal-breaker or deal-maker,
even more than agriculture, where difficulties had been resolved a few days earlier in
December 1993. The stakes were so high that probably the fate of maritime transport
services in the Uruguay Round (and later on in the WTO) owes a great deal to the dispute regarding audiovisual services.134
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D India
India’s original position was symmetrical to Brazil’s.135 Its strategy evolved along the
following lines: it would concede right to establishment (within bounds) if it could
extract a promise on movement of labour force. This is what Indian delegates termed
symmetrical treatment of labour and capital under the GATS. As the Indian negotiator, Ambassador Zutshi, stated in a publication some years after the end of the negotiations, India, through negotiation of meaningful commitments on the movement
of physical persons, wanted thus to establish ‘the principle of parity/symmetry in the
treatment of capital and labor’.136
India pushed hard during the negotiations for the inclusion of an Annex on the
movement of physical persons. Along with other developing countries (Argentina,
Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, and Peru) India submitted a very elaborate framework to facilitate movement of natural persons.137 Although the final
compromise (the current Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services
under the Agreement) falls short in comparison to the Indian proposal, there should
be no doubt that it was agreed largely because of the Indian push. India was one of the
leaders in the request to avoid a special and differential (S&D) treatment-type of provision (à la GATT) into the GATS text. India (like many developing countries) thought
that the GATT S&D treatment provisions (the 1980 Decision)138 was an after-thought.
As such, it did not influence the functionality and the understanding of the basic
GATT institutions. In the case of the GATS then, India and other developing countries
(including Brazil) wanted to see the concerns of developing countries embedded in as
many provisions as possible – these concerns should permeate the GATS text. From
that perspective, not only is Article IV of the GATS owed to that position championed
by India, but also Article XIX on Progressive Liberalization, and more generally, the
gradual – positive list – approach to making liberalization commitments.

E US
It is probably fair to state that the US influenced each and every GATS provision. The
US had in mind an investment type of agreement.139 Besides, it wanted a comprehensive and meaningful negotiation: no sectors should ab initio be excluded, and liberalization should be generated through the negotiation. The US was the first GATT
contracting party that tabled a comprehensive draft intended to serve as the basis
for concluding an agreement.140 Following heavy lobbying by specific groups, the US
decisively influenced the timing and outcome of negotiations for key sectors such as
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maritime transport, financial services, and basic telecoms.141 It was very much the US
position that led to the extension of negotiations on these three sectors. In the case of
financial services, the main reason was the US’s dissatisfaction with the level of liberalization offered by developing country partners, and the consequent fear that the
latter would free ride on the already open US financial market. Likewise, the US’s position on basic telecoms was not motivated by unwillingness to change domestic laws,
but rather by the genuine dissatisfaction with the offers made by its trading nations.142
The US had to fight a battle on taxation; the consistency of its sub-federal taxes with
the principle of non-discrimination was questionable, and, as with maritime transport, the US was unwilling to amend domestic laws.143 And, finally, recall that the
initial US model (an investment treaty, that is, a top down approach where everything
in principle should be covered and liberalized unless subsequently excluded through
negotiations) was dismissed by the rest of the GATT membership.
MFN was a key hurdle for the US, which did not give up on it until it obtained the
possibility of filing MFN exemptions, of which it made wide use. It is unwarranted,
however, to treat the US stance on MFN in the same way irrespective of the sector
involved. It had been largely the financial services and telecommunications industries
which opposed MFN as an automatic right. The telecommunications companies had a
strategic concern: the US was the only country at the time that permitted competition
in long-distance telephone services. An MFN obligation in telecoms by the US would
have permitted other countries’ monopolies to compete with the US private operators
in the US market with no corresponding opportunities for the US companies to operate
in monopoly markets. Here the American argument was simply that there could not
be MFN for this sector without market access. The US requested then the exclusion of
basic services, not value added telecoms services, where there was more global openness. The extended negotiations were made possible by policy shifts that had been
brewing for several years in the EU and a number of other countries. This formed the
basis for the extended negotiations on basic telecommunications, which have unquestionably been the most successful so far.
In the case of financial services, the US had a de facto MFN policy at work when it
came to admitting foreign financial institutions. For the banking industry – but also
securities – it was all about not getting enough market access (in foreign markets)
out of the negotiations, particularly after the so-called ‘hybrid’ approach to scheduling was finally resolved late in 1989. The US had held strongly to the negative list
approach for sector coverage and commitments throughout the period preceding that
141
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decision, largely because of financial services. ‘Progressive liberalization’ meant only
one thing to the US: continued protection in other markets. And the framework of
rules and principles meant little, absent commitments to market access. This is the
best example of some early enthusiasts turning sour on including services in the trade
rules. This changed after the extended negotiations, which were successfully concluded in December 1997, but it stuck during the life of the Uruguay Round.
The US position on maritime transport services, certainly defensive, was dictated
not only by the Jones Act and cabotage rights, something that could probably have
been reserved, but also by the wish to avail itself of the right to use unilateral action
provided by US statutes to address unfair trade practices abroad. Indeed, not long after
the conclusion of the round, the US took action against Japan’s unfair port practices
that made shipping to that country unprofitable. While the US shipping industry carried its brief out in a particularly belligerent way (with lots of pressure from the US
Congress on the US negotiators), the fact is that the only delegation willing to put
anything on the table was the EU.
In the case of air transport services, the notion of MFN as an applicable principle
to the principal aspects of operation (i.e., landing rights and ‘soft’ rights) was a nonstarter for just about every delegation. Market access for this sector had been negotiated on the basis of reciprocity since 1947 under the rules of the Chicago Convention.
The only delegation that was willing to forego these rules was that of New Zealand.
Although the Americans took the initiative to exclude most of this sector from the
GATS coverage (and therefore from MFN), virtually everyone was on the same page
here. The absence of any meaningful debate over this issue is the best proof of this
conclusion.

5 Concluding Remarks
There is no point in repeating how difficult it was to negotiate the GATS, a point that
has been time and again made in literature.144 Suffice it to underscore two elements
here:
(a) t his was no group of like-minded countries (like, more or less, the group of
countries that originally negotiated the GATT). The participants had diametrically opposite views even with respect to basic issues, such as the usefulness of a
multilateral regulatory framework;
(b) the issue as such is quite complicated. Over 60 years’ worth of GATT case law
shows that even nowadays it is sometimes a quixotic test to disentangle nondiscrimination from deregulation. This is very much the heart of the issue in the
services context, and it was not at all an enviable task for negotiators to come up
with a workable definition of a barrier to trade.
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With this in mind, let us add one caveat before we discuss our main findings: we
are not pronouncing on the reasons that led to the successful conclusion of the GATS.
What we care about is how the GATS unfolded and what lessons are to be drawn from
this negotiation.
With this in mind, we present the main findings of our work:
First, the negotiation narrative: once the opposition by developing countries
was overcome and talks were launched in 1986, negotiators spent the first three
years essentially educating themselves by asking questions about the size of trade
involved, the barriers encountered, etc. The future of the negotiations was very
much in doubt even in Montreal where the trading nations met for an early harvest; no harvest could be reported by those negotiating services, but the commitment to continue negotiating was solidified; from Montreal to the July Text
substantial progress was made in less than two years with respect to the general
framework of the GATS. Although the July Text was subsequently modified, it is
fair to state that the basic architecture of the GATS was negotiated there and then.
The Brussels Text is based on the July Text, contains many brackets, but leads nowhere because of the failure to conclude on CAP. The Dunkel Draft does not put
into question the essentials of the Brussels Text but is a welcome signal to the effect
that this issue is on the table and conclusion should follow. The period following
the Dunkel Draft (1991–1994) is dedicated to the negotiation of specific commitments, the result on the general framework having been judged (implicitly at least)
satisfactory.
Secondly, the issue of the forum should not be taken for granted. It is quite clear
that in the mind of the US at least, and the EU later, it should be the GATT. There is
not one single developed country that argued otherwise. Developing countries however, eventually wanted to find a new home for the services agreement. It is probably
the realization that trade-offs between (offers in) services and (requests in) goods were
possible that persuaded them to change course.
Thirdly, although dividing lines across developed and developing nations were
quite bright in the pre-negotiation phase (when every attempt by the US to move the
ball ahead was being consistently blocked), they had already become less of an issue
at Punta del Este. It is largely thanks to the efforts of the Café au Lait group, a heterogeneous group of countries, that the deadlock was overcome. Although this group
did not manage to keep its momentum in the subsequent phases of the negotiation, it
should be credited with substantially contributing to launching the first multilateral
trade in services.
Fourthly, India initially and Brazil throughout the round shaped their negotiating
position in the light of the prevailing ideology regarding trade in services in these two
countries. Developed countries are driven essentially by political economy-type considerations, powerful lobbies making specific requests that often find their way into
the final compromise. It is difficult to measure the resistance of ideology- and political
economy-based positions.
Fifthly, this is no time for exemplary statesmen like during the post World War II
period that saw the establishment of institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the
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IMF, and closer to our discussion, the GATT. The study by Irwin et al.145 shows that
individuals who marked the post-World War II construction of international cooperation were behind a trade agreement as well. The (subsequent) Economics Nobel Prize
winner James Meade was an active member of the UK delegation, as were the reputed
economics professors John Maynard Keynes and Lionel Robbins, and the French philosopher Alexandre Kojève. The 1980s is a different world. It is now modern bureaucracies that drive negotiations forward, and domestic inter-agency battles (like that
between USTR and US Treasury on financial services) have had important repercussions on the shaping of the negotiating agenda and the eventual compromise.146
Sixthly, the architecture of the agreement, as well as the majority of the provisions
are the brainchild of proposals by developed nations, to a large extent the US and the
EU. This is probably due to the fact that developing countries took a long time before
they became interested and involved in the issue; still, they were quite influential on
some issues (India, Mode IV147).
Seventhly, the US provided the impetus for signing the agreement, and the EU for
fine-tuning it. In a way, the Uruguay Round in this respect is not exceptional when
compared with previous rounds: it is another version of US idealism against (or complemented by) EU pragmatism/realism. The US started with a very ambitious agenda,
and the EU tailored it down to what could realistically be achieved within a heterogeneous multilateral context.
Eighthly, the GATT Secretariat was instrumental in getting the final text out. It is
not only the Dunkel Draft that came at a moment when a push was very much needed
not just for the negotiations on trade in services, but for the future of the round altogether. Throughout the period of the negotiations, the GATT Secretariat serviced
the trading nations, prepared useful papers on conceptual and practical issues, and
emerged as an honest broker.
Finally, the agreement as such is no monument of clarity. Indeed, it is very much
the outcome of an elaborate political compromise. The language chosen is often awkward, and it should come as no surprise that many of the disputes revolve round
misunderstandings regarding the ambit of specific provisions. It is hard to imagine
the GATS standing the test of time the way the GATT has done, still going strong
more than 60 years after its original drafting. Yet, it is the negotiating history that
we have discussed so far that explains why this has been the case: absent complex
compromises, we would probably not have seen GATS in the first place. Now, the first
decisive step has been taken. Future experience can make it a better, more workable
document.
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A. Irwin Douglas, P.C. Mavroidis, and A.O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (2008).
Although national delegations change over time and especially so in an 8-year period (that is, the time it
took to complete the round), the reader can get a flavour of the individuals involved in the negotiation of
the Uruguay Round by looking at GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/INF/1 of 27 Oct. 1986.
Mode IV refers to the temporary movement of physical persons.

